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BROWNFIELDS AT 20: 
A CRITICAL REEVALUATION 
Joel B. Eisen* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The revitalization of brownfields,1 once a theory, is now an in-
dustry. This industry, however, is not yet mature. It has been only 
twenty years since Congress attempted to give prospective pur-
chasers of real estate a defense to liability under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act 
("CERCLA"),2 and a little more than a decade since the majority 
of states began to embrace voluntary cleanup programs for aban-
doned or under-used sites.3 The ink is barely dry on the 2002 
CERCLA amendment that promises to reduce the risk of federal 
liability for brownfields developers.4 
* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. The author wishes 
to thank Ron Rosenberg for his insights on brownfields law and policy, Bill Wolfe of 
the New Jersey chapter of Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility 
("PEER") for information about New Jersey's brownfields programs, and Clay Burns 
for invaluable research assistance. 
1. New Jersey's definition of a brownfield is "[a]ny former or current commercial 
or industrial site that is currently vacant or underutilized and on which there has been, 
or there is suspected to have been, a discharge of a contaminant." N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 58:10B (West 2006). 
2. See Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act 
of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (2000); see also id. §§ 9601-9675; Susan Opp & Sarah 
Hollis, Contaminated Properties: History, Regulations, and Resources for Community 
Members, Univ. of Louisville Ctr. for Envtl. Pol'y & Mgmt., Practice Guide No. 9, at 6 
(2005), http://cepm.louisville.edu/Pubs_ WPapers/practiceguides/PG9.pdf (stating that 
"SARA [the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act] added the innocent 
landowner defense, which sought to ease the liability on people who had inherited or 
purchased property without knowledge of potential contamination"). 
3. See generally Joel B. Eisen, "Brownfields of Dreams?": Challenges and Limits 
of Voluntary Cleanup Programs and Incentives, 1996 U. ILL. L. REv. 883 [hereinafter 
Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams]; Joel B. Eisen, Brownfields Policies for Sustainable Cit-
ies, 9 DuKE ENVTL. L. & PoL'v F. 187 (1999). 
4. See Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 
2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9604-05, 9607, 9622, 9628 (2002); see also Seth Schofield, In Search 
of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The Failure of the Small Business Liability 
Relief and Brown fields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need for Federal Legislation, 
12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 956 (2005) (claiming that the Act "may be helpful but .. 
. is ultimately insufficient"); Fenton D. Strickland, Note, Brownfields Remediated? 
How the Bona Fide Prospective Purchaser Exemption from CERCLA Liability and 
the Windfall Lien Inhibit Brownfield Redevelopment, 38 IND. L. REV. 789, 804 (2005) 
(criticizing the Act's liability provision). For other criticisms of the Act, see William 
T.D. Freeland, Environmental Justice and the Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001: 
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Even in these relatively early days, brownfields remediation and 
reuse is almost universally viewed as a done deal-a major envi-
ronmental success story.5 Many point to state cleanup programs 
that have processed thousands of sites successfully, and there are 
numerous high-profile stories of successful conversions of ne-
glected sites to profitable reuse.6 Still, relatively little empirical 
work has been done to assess whether state and federal 
brownfields policies have been an unqualified success.7 Getting a 
handle on their value requires, among other things, accounting for 
the wide variety in state program features, the numbers of cases 
handled, and the types and numbers of results. It also requires 
looking longitudinally at a statistically significant sample of sites to 
see whether environmental problems develop or persist after a pe-
riod of years. 
The optimism about brownfields policies has considerable stay-
ing power, in part because it rests on a foundation of specific ex-
pectations about brownfields, their cleanup and reuse, and 
assumptions about the typical site and typical developer. These ex-
pectations relate to "the nature of brownfield properties; the ex-
pectations and behavior of public and private parties involved in 
the development, environmental, and financial risks; the impor-
tance of subsidies; and the investment climate of host communi-
ties. "8 In this Article, I term this foundation the "brownfields 
Brownfields of Dreams or a Nightmare in the Making?, 8 J. GENDER RAcE & JusT. 
183 (2004) (criticizing the Act on environmental justice grounds); Stanley A. Millan, 
Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL 
L. REv. 183, 198 (2005) (noting that brownfields developers could face windfall liens). 
5. See, e.g., Jennifer Felten, Brownfield Redevelopment 1995-2005: An Environ-
mental Justice Success Story?, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679 (2006). 
6. Kris Wemstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon: Much Ado About Some-
thing or the Timing of the Shrewd? 4 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper 04-
46, 2004), available at http://www.rff.org/Documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf [hereinafter 
Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon] (noting that "[i]f one compares the state 
of affairs vis-a-vis the redevelopment of brownfields today to that of 10 years ago, it is 
clear that federal and state promotion of brownfields has yielded numerous success 
stories of idled and underutilized contaminated properties that now house a variety of 
economic activities"); see also infra note 54 and accompanying text (discussing success 
stories in Rust Belt cities). 
7. See David A. Dana, State Brownfields Programs as Laboratories of Democ-
racy?, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 86, 86 (2005) (noting that "state brownfields programs 
represent a lost opportunity-the opportunity to empirically test different approaches 
to real property remediation"); Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenom, supra 
note 6, at 4 (noting that "[t]he empirical literature on brownfields-a topic that cuts 
across many disciplines and scales and is open to a wide range of methodological 
approaches-remains undeveloped relative to its potential"). 
8. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 4. 
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story," and suggest that it is time for a more detailed analysis of 
this story after a decade of experience with brownfields remedia-
tion and reuse, and, as a consequence, a re-examination of whether 
brownfields programs meet their original goals, and whether those 
goals were the right ones. 
Those involved in brownfields remediation pin many hopes on 
the process. They seek to discover and rehabilitate neglected sites, 
reverse the decay of urban cores, and, in some ·cases, link with 
smart growth strategies by slowing the march of development to 
suburban and exurban America. The parcel-by-parcel approach to 
brownfields remediation and reuse, however, cannot possibly guar-
antee all that. There are thousands of brownfields sites and each 
has a different experience.9 As a leading study pointed out, "[e]ach 
brownfield redevelopment decision can trigger a variety of con-
cerns related to the long-term vision of a community, threats to 
public health and nature, economic livelihoods, social equity, and 
public participation. "10 The paradox of brownfields programs is 
that they may have considerable legitimacy when one looks at the 
successful remediation and reuse of individual parcels, but as a 
whole, the policies may or may not be contributing measurably to 
the long-term health of communities throughout the nation. 
It is time to decide how nascent state programs could best pro-
mote a comprehensive approach to urban redevelopment. This in 
turn requires us to decide whether the assumptions about 
brownfields programs' success are substantiated in practice. I am 
not at all suggesting that brownfields revitalization needs to end, 
yet, as I argue in this Article, the brownfields story is partly incor-
rect. Consider this recent summary: "Many of the premises [of 
brownfields policies] may have a factual base, while others may be 
rooted in unsubstantiated assertions of mixed quality or outright 
misunderstandings. "11 As a result of this partial breakdown of the 
story, it is time for a reorientation of brownfields law and policy 
that moves it toward a development-centered approach to 
brownfields, not one that caters specifically to developers. 
In this Article, I will look at brownfields policies in one state, 
New Jersey, and suggest how to make the approach of brownfields 
9. For an early but still relevant and important discussion of a number of differ-
ent experiences, see generally EDITH M. PEPPER, NoRTHEAST-MmwEsT INST., 
LESSONS FROM THE FIELD: UNLOCKING ECONOMIC POTENTIAL WITH AN ENVIRON-
MENTAL KEY (1997), http://www.nemw.org/lessons.htm. 
10. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 4. 
11. Id. 
724 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XXXIV 
revitalization more development-centered and less developer-cen-
tered. New Jersey's program is worth examining for a number of 
reasons. First, it has processed a large number of sites. There are 
an estimated 10,000 brownfields sites in the state (though not all 
have commercial potential),12 and a number of developers pro-
ceeded successfully to cleanups using the state Memorandum of 
Agreement ("MOA").13 In the state's Voluntary Cleanup Program 
("VCP"), 14 a party who wants to remediate a site enters into an 
MOA with the state's environmental agency, the Department of 
Environmental Protection ("NJDEP" or "DEP"). The MOA, as is 
typical for similar programs in other states, establishes the scope of 
assessment and remediation activities, including anything from pre-
liminary assessment at the site to remedial actions and reuse of the 
site. New Jersey's program is a typical one that allows all sites (not 
just those designated as brownfields) to enter into the VCP, but 
also has elements tailored specifically to brownfields, including a 
statewide task force 15 and an "Office of Brownfield Reuse. "16 
There are some analyses17 and some limited empirical evidence18 
12. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation and Waste Mgmt. Program Fre-
quently Asked Questions, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/faq/ (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2007); see also Michael Greenberg et al., Brownfield Redevelopment and Af-
fordable Housing: A Case Study of New Jersey, 12 HousING PoL'Y DEBATE 515, 517 
(2001), available at http://www.fanniemaefoundation.org/programs/hpd/pdf/HPD_ 
1203_greenberg.pdf [hereinafter Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing] (noting that 
"only 1,157 of these 10,000 sites have commercial potential"). 
13. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup Program, http://www.nj.gov/dep/ 
srp/volclean/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot. Volun-
tary Cleanup]. New Jersey has two different MOAs: one for residential properties 
and one for non-residential properties. See id. 
14. Id. 
15. N.J. Office of Smart Growth, Brownfields Redevelopment Task Force, http:// 
www.nj.gov/dca/osg/commissions/brownfields/taskforce.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 
2007). The Task Force was created in 1998 by the New Jersey Brownfield and Con-
taminated Site Remediation Act. See NAT'L GOVERNORS Ass'N, NEw M1ssION FoR 
BROWNFIELDS: ATTACKING SPRAWL BY REVITALIZING OLDER COMMUNITIES 18-20 
(2000), http://www.nga.org/Files/pdf/REPORT200010BROWNFIELDS.pdf (discuss-
ing the Task Force and its activities). 
16. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Office of Brownfield Reuse, http://www.nj.gov/dep/ 
srp/brownfields/obr/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
17. See, e.g., Lynn Singband, Brownfield Redevelopment Legislation: Too Little, 
but Never Too Late, 14 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REv. 313, 314-15 (2003) (analyzing New 
Jersey's program "because New Jersey was one of the first states to pass brownfields 
legislation; it is the most densely populated state, which makes development pressure 
in the state enormous; and its legislation is a good example of a typical response to 
brownfields"). 
18. See generally MICHAEL GREENBERG ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR NEIGHBORHOOD 
AND BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, THE IMPACT OF MOTHBALLED INDUSTRIAL 
SITES ON URBAN REDEVELOPMENT IN NEW JERSEY (2000), http://policy.rutgers.edu/ 
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about the program, as it was one of the earliest brownfields pro-
grams and has been in place for over a decade. New Jersey is also 
attempting to use second-generation approaches19 to improve the 
relationship of brownfields cleanups and urban redevelopment, 
most notably the Brownfields Development Area ("BDA").20 In 
short, the brownfields program is maturing and growing , and well 
worth the analytical look. 
Following a basic description of the New Jersey program, I will 
discuss two specific developments, the BDA initiative and the re-
cent "Grace Period Rule," that changed some aspects of the pro-
gram. My aim is more modest than a full-scale re-evaluation of all 
brownfields programs (or indeed of the New Jersey program in its 
totality); instead I look at the experience within one program to 
assess whether there is movement toward the development-cen-
tered approach. I find that some developments in New Jersey are 
positive, notably the BDA's approach to addressing multiple 
brownfield sites concurrently in the same location. On the other 
hand, the Grace Period Rule introduces the prospect for additional 
delay in cleanups that is unwarranted given the current program 
structure. 
II. DRAWBACKS OF THE BROWNFIELDS STORY 
The prevailing brownfields story has been repeated so often that 
it is essentially unchallenged. The story looks something like this: a 
developer, perhaps a hospital or university that has no prior experi-
ence with the environmental enforcement scheme, decides to look 
at a piece of abandoned or underused urban property, typically lo-
cated in a declining Rust Belt city. While the abandoned property 
was most likely a site with a history of industrial uses (although, 
with its former owner out of the picture, it may be hard to tell), its 
primary attribute is that no one has touched it for the last decade 
or more. The site's advantages are clear: it is large enough for de-
velopment and located near railroads and other forms of transpor-
brownfields/mothballs2.pdf [hereinafter GREENBERG ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDE-
VELOPMENT]; Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing, supra note 12. 
19. See generally D. Evan van Hook et al., The Challenge of Brownfield Clusters: 
Implementing a Multi-Site Approach for Brownfield Remediation and Reuse, 12 
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 111 (2003) (discussing New Jersey's Brownfields Development 
Area ("BDA") and terming it a second-generation approach). 
20. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, http:// 
www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J. 
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative]; see also infra notes 
171-75 and accompanying text (discussing the BDA initiative). 
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tation;21 it is also within striking distance of a large population that 
can provide jobs and shopping opportunities for the new shopping 
center or hospital or (to be trendy) biotechnology research park. 
Ultimately, the abandoned site that had been previously used for 
manufacturing will become an apartment complex or a ballpark, 
and yield a bushel of economic benefits to the municipality. 
The prospective developer, inexperienced with environmental 
enforcement, does not know where to start. It is afraid to contact 
the state environmental protection department because it fears the 
unknown. As much literature has explained, the developer may 
face potential liability as an owner or operator under CERCLA 
(or one of its state counterparts) as a result of taking ownership, or 
even by undertaking to clean up and reuse the property.22 
In most cases, the story assumes that residual contamination is 
not all that serious-otherwise the site would have presumably at-
tracted attention from state regulators who force site cleanups in 
state CERCLA-like programs.23 So, the future of the developer 
when it tackles an urban brownfields site is hardly a complete im-
ponderable. The site might be more difficult to develop than its 
greenfield counterpart24 and presents the potential of environmen-
tal risk. The developer faces two possible outcomes, with one far 
more likely than the other. In the first scenario, the developer 
steps in with the aid of incentives that tip the scale in favor of tak-
ing on risk. It finds that the site is not all that contaminated and 
cleanup is therefore neither costly or difficult. It cleans up the site, 
utters the proverbial sigh of relief, gets a state's signoff through 
some form of liability release, and moves on to build a Wal-Mart or 
ballpark. In the second (less likely) scenario, the site is tossed back 
into the enforcement hopper because a serious environmental 
problem is discovered. 
21. See Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 1. 
22. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 898. This is somewhat in-
ternally inconsistent: it presumes that the developer has little knowledge of environ-
mental matters but understands federal law well enough to know that if it becomes 
involved with the property then it faces liability. 
23. See id. at 899-900. 
24. See, e.g., H. Wade VanLandingham et al., Public Strategies for Cost-Effective 
Community Brownfield Redevelopment, Univ. of Louisville Ctr. for Envtl. Pol'y & 
Mgmt., Practice Guide No. 1, at 1-2 (2002), http://cepm.louisville.edu/Pubs_ WPapers/ 
practiceguides/PGl.pdf (noting that "[t]he process of developing a vacant or agricul-
tural greenfield site is well understood. [and this] is not true of brownfield 
redevelopment"). 
2007] BROWNFIELDS AT 20 727 
It is the uncertainty about whether a given site is a scenario one 
site or a scenario two site that hampers remediation and reuse.25 
The developer prepared a business case for its project which 
showed that if the environmental cost (a number plugged into the 
ubiquitous spreadsheet) becomes anything more than a de minimis 
amount-half a million dollars, a million, or even more-it will 
sink the profit of the development. Therefore, the developer, fear-
ing the unknown, flees to the suburban greenfield location where 
things are much more predictable;.26 there is no environmental 
remediation cost27 and the land cost is less, therefore the project 
cost is a known commodity. Moreover, the development is not 
subject to the vagaries of the urban political landscape. Starting at 
the pristine greenfield location, the developer can proceed with its 
development in a relatively short timeframe: one year, maybe two, 
but little more. The biotech research park is then open for opera-
tion, or the shopping mall with its trendy stores is turning out 
denim and dollars. The urban brownfield site remains undisturbed, 
awaiting a savvier, less risk-averse developer. 
At the outset, then, the brownfields policymaker puts herself in 
the developer's shoes and asks, "Why would anyone run the risk 
associated with urban brownfields sites?"28 The "why," of course, 
is increasingly addressed by programs that come to the aid of de-
velopers, attempting to make it possible for them to assess the en-
vironmental risks on properties, clean them up if necessary, and 
then proceed to reuse, all in a streamlined fashion. 29 
25. Id. at 12-13. 
26. See, e.g., id. at 3 (noting that "[g]reenfield sites (previously undeveloped 
properties) are usually in such higher demand areas, cost less per acre to develop, and 
do not involve as much risk and uncertainty for investors"). 
27. This assumes the suburban or exurban site is not a brownfield. As a study by 
the group Resources for the Future explains, this may not be the case. See Wernstedt 
et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 7 ("Numerous brownfield sites can 
be found in mining areas and more generally throughout rural America."). 
28. In his comments at the signing of the 2002 CERCLA amendments, President 
George W. Bush stated: 
Many communities and entrepreneurs have sought to redevelop brownfields. 
Often they could not, either because of excessive regulation or because of 
the fear of endless litigation. As a consequence, small businesses and other 
employers have located elsewhere-pushing development farther and far-
ther outward, taking jobs with them, and leaving cities empty. 
Remarks on Signing the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitaliza-
tion Act in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania, 38 WKLY. COMP. PRES. Doc. 52, 53 (Jan. 11, 
2002), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/wcomp/v38no2.html (follow link under 
Bill Signing for Small Business Liability Relief & Brownfields Revitalization Act). 
29. See, e.g., VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 3 (noting that "[t]he situation 
changed in the 1990s as states passed laws and regulations including Voluntary 
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Thus, from the beginning, the foundation of brownfields law and 
policy has been developer-centered, not development-centered.30 
Grounding revolutionary changes on liability protection for poten-
tial accidental and unforeseen victims of environmental liability en-
shrined the prominence of facilitating the real estate transaction at 
a brownfields site.31 New Jersey describes its brownfields remedia-
tion process as "user friendly"32 and, compared to CERCLA, 
claims that it is the height of responsiveness, not enforcement 
"hide the ball." The developer voluntarily signs a contract with the 
state that specifies precisely what obligations it will undertake and 
what cleanup it will perform.33 Since the inception of brownfields 
remediation programs, there has been a sea of change in attitudes 
toward the remediation of contaminated sites. To the development 
community, the attitude change is a welcomed relief. 
The result, not surprisingly, has been considerable interest in the 
brownfields revitalization process, and it is no wonder that there 
are many tools developed and sources available for pragmatic 
brownfields redevelopment. There is an array of sources for fi-
nancing, even insurance (which, even though underused at present, 
has been developed in creative ways for brownfields redevelop-
ment), 34 and there are numerous guides to federal brownfields ini-
tiatives and state voluntary cleanup programs.35 Annual national 
Cleanup Programs and more flexible cleanup standards for brownfields based on in-
tended new uses of sites"). 
30. See Singband, supra note 17, at 315 (noting that "current brownfield revitaliza-
tion statutes will do little to increase brownfield redevelopment because they focus on 
limited liability rather than on cost issues and public and environmental health and 
safety"). 
31. In the "go-go" real estate development market of the 1990s, this message reso-
nated deeply. See, e.g., Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 8 (noting that "[t]he booming 
economy of the late 90s undoubtedly also contributed to the increase in development 
projects of all kinds"). 
32. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prat., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
33. The New Jersey MOA documents for residential and non-residential proper-
ties can be found at N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prat., Memorandum of Agreement for Resi-
dential Props., http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/volclean/moa2_res.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 
2007) & N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prat., Memorandum of Agreement for Non-Residential 
Props., http://www.nj.gov/dep/srp/volclean/moa2_nr.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
34. The EPA discusses successful uses of insurance at U.S. Envtl. Prat. Agency, 
Environmental Insurance Helps Ensure Redevelopment, EPA 500-F-03-232 (July 
2003), available at http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/success/insurance.pdf. See gener-
ally Peter B. Meyer et al., Brownfield Redevelopers' Perceptions of Environmental 
Insurance: An Appraisal and Review of Public Policy Options (Lincoln Inst. of Land 
Pol'y, Working Paper WP02PM1, 2002), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/ 
dl/664_meyer02web.pdf. 
35. See, e.g., CHARLES BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN FOR EcoNOMIC DEVEL-
OPMENT: A RESOURCE BOOK ON ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AND ECONOMIC DE-
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brownfields conferences attract thousands of participants.36 New 
Jersey maintains a "site mart" that matches prospective developers 
and prospective sites, a kind of eBay for brownfield sites in New 
Jersey.37 The prevailing sense is that states are open for business 
when it comes to brownfields. Indeed, brownfields incentives are 
now one part of the increasing trend of localities offering incen-
tives to attract real estate development.38 
The primary brownfields incentives, of course, are those offered 
by the voluntary cleanup programs now available in all but one 
state that provide road maps for developers to approach state envi-
ronmental agencies or brownfields revitalization agencies (if they 
exist) and deal directly with the states.39 The new federal law pro-
VELOPMENT OPPORTUNITIES (1996), available at http://www.nemw.org/cmclean.htm 
[hereinafter BARTSCH ET AL, CoMING CLEAN]; LINDA BREGGIN ET AL, A GUIDE-
BOOK FOR BROWNFIELD PROPERTY OWNERS (1999), available at http:// 
www.elistore.org/reports_detail.asp?id=459; BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE 
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (Todd s. Davis ed., 2d ed. 
2002); BROWNFIELDS LAW & PRACTICE: THE CLEANUP & REDEVELOPMENT OF CON-
TAMINATED LAND (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 1998 & Supp. 2005); ELIZABETH GLASS 
GELTMAN, RECYCLING LAND: UNDERSTANDING THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE OF BROWN-
FIELD DEVELOPMENT (2000); IMPLEMENTING INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS AT 
BROWNFIELDS AND OTHER CONTAMINATED SITES (Amy L. Edwards ed., 2003); RON-
ALD ROSENBERG, BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT: CLEANING UP CONTAMINATED 
SITES FOR COMMUNITY RENEWAL (2000); RONALD ROSENBERG, COMMUNITY RE-
SOURCE GUIDE FOR BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT (2002). For websites with useful 
information see Center for Brownfields Initiatives at the University of New Orleans, 
Homepage, http://www.brownfields.com (last visited Mar. 31, 2007); U.S. Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelopment Page, http://www.epa.gov/ 
brownfields (last visited Dec. 2, 2006); Nat'! Ctr. for Neighborhood and Brownfields 
Redevelopment, Homepage, http://www.policy.rutgers.edu/brownfields (last visited 
Mar. 31, 2007); Northeast-Midwest Institute, Homepage, http://www.nemw.org (last 
visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
36. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 4,000-plus Expected at 10th 
National Brownfields Conference Nov. 2nd-4th at Denver's Colorado Convention 
Center (Mar. 10, 2005), http://yosemite.epa.gov/r8/r8media.nsf/Published%5C2005! 
OpenView (follow "March" hyperlink). 
37. See State of New Jersey, Brownfields Site Mart, http://www.njsitemart.com 
(last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
38. VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 8 ("This expansion of state brownfield 
programs is a logical outgrowth of broader state innovation and competition in efforts 
to encourage new investment and associated economic development."). Another 
commentator sees brownsfields programs as more "politically acceptable" than direct 
subsidies and other forms of aid to cities. See Michael R. Greenberg, Editorial, Re-
versing Urban Decay: Brownfield Redevelopment and Environmental Health, 111 
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. A74 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.ehponline.org/docs/ 
2003/111-2/EHPl 11pa7 4 PDF .PDF [hereinafter Greenberg, Edi to rial]. 
39. See Charles Bartsch, Brownfields State of the States in 2004, NE-MW EcoN. 
REv., Fall 2004, at 14, 14, available at http://www.nemw.org/ER %20brownfields.pdf 
[hereinafter Bartsch, State of States] (noting that "[i]n 2004, South Dakota became the 
49th state to adopt a formal brownfields program"). 
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vides some shelter for a developer that engages with the state, re-
ducing the risk (claimed to exist well over a decade ago )40 that the 
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") will overfile41 and con-
clude that a cleanup completed successfully in a state program is 
not acceptable at the federal level. The EPA's new "all appropri-
ate inquiries" rule apparently ensures that if a developer follows 
procedures that are rapidly becoming widely accepted industry 
standards it should have little to fear from the EPA.42 
This brownfields story has led to certain basic trends in remedia-
tion and reuse. First and foremost, developers are treated as a 
monolithic group in most voluntary cleanup programs. Virtually 
anyone willing to tackle the remediation and reuse of a site can do 
so, with few exceptions. Because developers engage voluntarily 
with the state, they presumably lack culpability and, therefore, con-
trol the timing, sequencing, and even the comprehensiveness of 
remediation and reuse. The developer that takes the lead at a 
brownfield site dictates the terms of the cleanup and redevelop-
ment strategy, otherwise it is assumed that it would not be worth-
while to proceed.43 The result is a level of trust unheard of in other 
contexts. The MOA or a similar document empowers the devel-
oper to clean up the site, and the state's role is limited to that of 
overseer. This means that the remediation outcome is only as good 
as the state's ability to verify the results.44 In states where 
remediation at a brownfield site can proceed without state involve-
ment of any sort, the only verification is indirect through state-cer-
tified consultants who approve the cleanup results.45 
What does the state get in return for ceding control? When a 
developer comes to the state, it presumably has alternatives, in-
cluding the option of no action. Without a developer ready to take 
on the risk of developing a brownfield site (which is presumptively 
40. See generally Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3. 
41. See Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that "[t]his act works to limit 
'overfiling' by the EPA when a cleanup occurs through a state program"). 
42. See Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 40 C.F.R. § 312 
(2005). The EPA's "All Appropriate Inquiries" page is located at http://www.epa.gov/ 
brownfields/regneg.htm. Some commentators have observed that this rule may not 
offer sufficient protection to brownfields developers. See, e.g., Strickland, supra note 
4, at 790. At the very least, there is residual uncertainty. See Opp & Hollis, supra 
note 2, at 7 ("Because the Act is still recent, its full effect on the status of brownfields 
is not yet clear. While it does ease CERCLA liability and promote redevelopment of 
sites, the provisions are lengthy and will undoubtedly be modified as the EPA pro-
vides further guidance and new judicial decisions arise."). 
43. See Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 965-70. 
44. See id. at 1021. 
45. See id. at 968-69. 
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deemed to be higher than that of a greenfield site even though it 
may not be), the brownfield site would remain fallow. In return for 
its streamlining of the environmental law scheme, the state receives 
a promise that the locality will see certain economic benefits once 
the property is back in use in its commercial, retail, residential, or 
other setting.46 
This story, though appealing, may well tum out to be inaccurate 
in whole or part in many cases. Brownfields policies were put into 
place on the basis of considerable faith in the power of fear and the 
resulting need to stop punishing developers, not the strength of 
available data. On the whole, there is not as much knowledge 
about the brownfields revitalization process as originally thought in 
the 1980s and 1990s.47 There is a lack of satisfactory empirical evi-
dence because, with roughly a decade of experience, studies of 
brownfields law and policy are just now starting to emerge.48 
There are essentially two types of studies underway: (1) those 
involving problem characterization (how many brownfields sites 
are in a given state or locality; how many of these have commercial 
potential; and so forth);49 and (2) those developing a knowledge 
base of success stories that prospective developers can use to de-
velop their own roadmaps for successful cleanups at their sites.50 
The latter includes case studies of individual brownfields sites in 
Trenton,51 Worcester,52 Baltimore,53 and other ideal Rust Belt can-
46. Wernstedt et al., Brown fields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10 (discussing the 
importance of economic benefits to brownfields redevelopment projects). 
47. See id. at 4 (noting that empirical literature on brownfields remains 
undeveloped). 
48. An intriguing proposal to spur more studies is set forth in Dana, supra note 7, 
at 86-87 (calling for "an amendment to the federal CERCLA statute that would limit 
liability for participants in brownfields cleanups in states that employ a system of 
standardized data-collection regarding the development, implementation, and out-
comes of at least a significant sample of their approved brownfields cleanups"). 
49. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 5-6 (noting that "a 
small number of studies have relied on original surveys to systematically collect infor-
mation on the scope of the brownfields problem"). The National Center for Neigh-
borhood and Brownfields Redevelopment at Rutgers University has collected data on 
the number and attributes of mothballed brownfield sites. See generally GREENBERG 
ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT, supra note 18. 
50. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 5 (noting that 
"much of what we know about brownfields and the barriers to their redevelopment 
has come from case studies of individual redevelopment projects"). 
51. Trenton is one of the EPA's "Brownfields Showcase Communities." See U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, Trenton Brownfields Ride a Wave of Revitalization, EPA 500-F-
02-168 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/ss_trent.pdf. 
52. The Northeast-Midwest Institute's Lessons from the Field discusses the $200 
million "Medical City" project that "involved cleaning up and reusing 24 acres of 
blighted downtown property, and which is expected to create 3,000 new jobs and have 
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didates for brownfields policies (as well as a number of others),54 
where striking successes have been documented. Yet this anecdo-
tal evidence of success, given the wide variety in approaches and 
results, is perhaps most useful as a process guide for other cities, 
not as a comprehensive justification of brownfields policies.55 
Brownfields programs have not been studied in an overall sys-
tematic way,56 and it is possible that comprehensive studies would 
show that the vast majority of sites involve a win-win of successful 
remediation and benefits to the host community. Certainly those 
high-profile sites trumpeted by the EPA and the states are, in fact, 
places where benefits have materialized.57 Yet, the supporting data 
is just now emerging.58 
Does this relative lack of certainty matter? If redevelopment 
potential is stymied by the fear of contamination at an urban site, a 
suburban site, or even an exurban site, that any remediation and 
reuse activity is better than the "no action" alternative. Yet just as 
the status quo may be preferable to environmentally damaging ac-
tivities in other contexts,59 it may be so here as well, where the 
benefits of "no action" may outweigh the costs of increased human 
activity at a brownfields site.60 
a total direct economic impact of $875 million within its first ten years of operation." 
PEPPER, supra note 9, at ch. 1. 
53. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Redevelopment Opportunities Taking Hold in 
Baltimore, EPA 500-F-02-153 (2002), available at http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/pdf/ 
ss_balti.pdf. 
54. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Brownfields Success Stories, http://www.epa.gov/ 
brownfields/success.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
55. Wemstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 3-4 (noting that 
"most brownfield efforts have taken a property-by-property approach that aims at 
supporting the highest and best use of individual properties," but "[w]hether these 
[brownfield success stories] have helped to revitalize distressed areas and contribute 
to a more sustainable community is a more difficult question, however."). 
56. Id. at 1 (noting that "[u]nfortunately ... the enthusiasm for brownfields reuse 
generally has not been matched by systematic, careful documentation of actual prac-
tice at a wide range of sites"); see also Dana, supra note 7, at 101 (noting that as of 
2005, the "paucity of our knowledge about the actual results of state brownfields 
programs"). 
57. See Brownfields Success Stories, supra note 54. 
58. See generally Wemstedt et al., supra note 6, at 4-6 (discussing empirical studies 
conducted as of 2004 and their limitations). 
59. The example I have in mind is the requirement in the National Environmental 
Policy Act to study the alternative of "no action" because it may turn out to be prefer-
able to a federal agency's chosen course of action. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 4332 (West 
2000). 
60. See, e.g., Dana, supra note 7, at 93-94. 
One might argue that, regardless of the quality of a brownfields cleanup, and 
even if the quality is significantly lower than would be required under CER-
CLA, some cleanup is better than no cleanup. All else being equal, perhaps 
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First, state programs are not limited to urban sites with potential 
for development. As a recent study explains, "[i]n theory, 
brownfields programs focus on sites in urban areas and VCPs focus 
on any site. The truth is that state programs often do not make 
such distinctions."61 Urban sites' perceived advantages, in terms of 
transportation, jobs, and so forth, tum out to be applicable to a 
much smaller number of brownfields sites than envisioned by the 
prevailing wisdom.62 More importantly, the promise of economic 
benefits through redevelopment is not a requirement for a devel-
oper's entry into the voluntary cleanup process. Some states such 
as Michigan, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania63 attempt to make 
some connection between brownfields cleanups and redevelop-
ment efforts (but even those states typically tie a brownfield desig-
nation to eligibility for funding64 or other state benefits,65 not to 
Id. 
some cleanup is always better than no cleanup. But all else is not equal: 
before a brownfields cleanup, a site may well not be in use or may be only 
minimally in use, such that there are no or few contact points between site 
contamination and human beings. After a cleanup and redevelopment, a 
site may be the subject of intensive, daily use by a large number of people. 
In other words, while one effect of a brownfields cleanup may be to reduce 
the level of contamination, another effect may be to increase human expo-
sure to the contamination on the site. To the extent that the second effect 
dominates the first, a brownfields cleanup may, putting other benefits from 
redevelopment aside, make matters worse. Some cleanup, in certain in-
stances, may be worse than none. 
61. Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 9. 
62. Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 7. Nor are these 
sites necessarily the former industrial sites envisioned by the model. One recent study 
found that a minority of brownfield sites had "hosted light/heavy industry." Id. ("Our 
environmental insurance survey of nearly 50 private developers of brownfield sites 
found that sites under redevelopment most commonly had hosted light/heavy industry 
(32%), mixed use (26%), commercial (22%), and residential (11 %) activities."). 
63. VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 8 ("The states with the most active 
VCPs also tend to have special economic stimulus packages targeting brownfields, or 
to regions or locations that are likely to contain them. Michigan, for example, pro-
vides special incentives to its 'Renaissance Zones;' Pennsylvania has a 'Special Indus-
trial Areas' cleanup standard and other states have targeted their federally designated 
Empowerment Zones or Enterprise Communities or their own state enterprise zones 
for brown fields incentives."). 
64. The New Jersey DEP works with the state's Economic Development Author-
ity to provide money from the Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund for site 
remediation. Under state law, a developer that enters into a redevelopment agree-
ment may potentially recoup up to seventy-five percent of her cleanup costs. See N.J. 
Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund, http:// 
www.nj.gov/dep/srp/finance/hdsrf/ (last visited Mar. 31, 2007); see also Martha N. 
Donovan, How to Deal with NJDEP Violations, METROPOLITAN CoRP. CouNs., Apr. 
2006, at 29, http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pdf/2006/April/29.pdf (noting that 
"[t]he New Jersey Commerce and Economic Growth Commission and the Depart-
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eligibility to enter a VCP).66 VCPs, however, are not primarily 
concerned with the prospective developers' motives. A developer 
that plans to mothball a site is just as eligible as one who plans a 
massive urban redevelopment project.67 Even where developers 
plan for urban growth, the promised economic benefits may fail to 
materialize. This is an area, of course, that has been studied exten-
sively in urban policy literature and arose recently in Keto v. City of 
New London,68 where Justice O'Connor, in dissent, opposed a tak-
ing by the city of New London in part because it was grounded on 
a redevelopment plan with hazy promises of future economic 
benefits.69 
The fear of environmental contamination and the high cost asso-
ciated with remediation have proven less important to prospective 
brownfields redevelopers than previously thought.70 One study 
found that only eight percent of the cost of developing a brown-
field site is attributable to the cost of environmental remediation.71 
Another author observed that even after developers do some envi-
ronmental assessments at brownfield sites, they still tend to overes-
ment of Treasury, in consultation with NJDEP, negotiate and approve redevelopment 
agreements if the project is appropriate and reasonable and there is a clear indication 
that, but for the availability of the funding, the developer is not going to do the 
project"). 
Id. 
65. See, e.g., Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
VCPs vary in their focus, with some emphasizing redevelopment of sites 
more heavily than others. The level of redevelopment incentives also de-
pends upon which state organization oversees the state program. If it is an 
economic development department rather than an environmental depart-
ment, the state brownfield program will be more likely to offer economic 
incentives to developers and to have variable cleanup standards, rather than 
adhering to more stringent cleanup standards. 
66. Eligibility in New Jersey's VCP is extended to "[a]ny person not subject to the 
New Jersey Underground Storage of Hazardous Substances Act or the Industrial Site 
Recovery Act." N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.2(a) (2005). 
67. This phenomenon is discussed in GREENBERG ET AL., BROWNFIELDS REDE-
VELOPMENT, supra note 18, at i (noting that "[o]nly anecdotal information exists. 
about the prevalence of the problem"). 
68. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
69. Id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
70. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 9 ("Recent 
work also has explored the economics of brownfields redevelopment, suggesting that 
contamination may not be as significant a constraint to property transactions as the 
prevailing sentiment of the 1980s and early 1990s suggested."). 
71. See Greenberg et al., Affordable Housing, supra note 12, at 518 (citing a study 
by the Council for Urban Economic Development [now the International Economic 
Development Council, or IEDC]). 
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timate the remaining environmental risk.72 More importantly, 
studies based on surveys of real estate developers found many rea-
sons other than environmental risk that led developers to shun ur-
ban sites, including "basic real estate fundamentals. "73 
There are two sets of potential problems relating to treating de-
velopers as a monolithic group. First, a developer, unlike the 
"newbie" volunteer of the brownfields story, may not be so inno-
cent. Consider two different but related possibilities. The devel-
oper, far from being unfamiliar with the environmental 
enforcement system, may in fact be quite savvy and manipulate the 
system by enrolling a less meritorious site in the state's voluntary 
cleanup program (perhaps even one that should be subject to state 
environmental enforcement).74 While states are supposed to have 
checks in place to ensure this does not happen, there are instances 
where sites may fall through the cracks for one reason or another. 
There may not be the resources or political will for vigorous 
gatekeeping. 
Second, the conduct of a cleanup can fall off the rails and come 
up far short of the one that we expect from an innocent developer. 
The cleanup program, of course, can encourage or discourage inad-
equate cleanups by its structure. A cleanup can take a long time 
under an MOA if a developer does not do what it promised to do, 
or if the cleanup takes longer than expected and the state does not 
devote enough oversight attention to it.75 
There is also a temporal element to this. A developer may at-
tempt to conduct remediation in the right way, but it may later be 
discovered that it was not done correctly. This failure can be at-
tributable to cleanup standards that are streamlined76 in voluntary 
cleanup programs, which is one of the program's major attrac-
72. See VanLandingham et al., supra note 24, at 12 (noting that prospective 
brownfields developers "tend to exaggerate the project uncertainty that remains 
[even] after completion of a site assessment that meets the [American Society for 
Testing and Materials] ASTM standards"). 
73. See Wemstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 9 (finding that 
"basic real estate fundamentals often pose more significant obstacles to redevelop-
ment of any previously used urban land than does contamination"). 
74. See Dana, supra note 7, at 87 (noting that "brownfields programs are likely to 
be used to address even very seriously contaminated sites that are not already subject 
to a CERCLA cleanup"). 
75. There are other possibilities; for example, differing results due to variations in 
the skill and competence of consultants hired to do cleanups. See Shari Shapiro, The 
Effectiveness of Pennsylvania's Act 2: Are Good Mechanics Enough?, 24 TEMP. 
ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 441, 455 (2005). 
76. Or perhaps a process of assessing the site that requires hasty judgments. See 
Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A 74. 
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tions.77 These streamlined cleanup standards often allow develop-
ers to use "institutional controls," the popular means of fencing, 
zoning controls, deed, or covenant restrictions78 that do not involve 
actual cleanups at the sites.79 It is conceivable that this harnessing 
of contamination (rather than an actual cleanup80) could fail years 
later.81 This may be yet another indication that the program adopts 
Id. 
Environmental scientists working in state and local government may find 
brownfields cases placed at the top of their action list, with a demand for 
action in a matter of a few weeks or a month, rather than months or years. 
Environmental health scientists in companies will be pressed to develop and 
use monitoring equipment that provides quick and decisive information to 
investors. 
77. Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3, at 933; see also Wernstedt et al., 
Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 13 (observing that "the relative effective-
ness of nonfinancial interventions-a change in regulatory requirements such as re-
ducing cleanup standards or liability relief that releases 'innocent' parties at 
contaminated sites from long-term damage claims-may be even more critical [to suc-
cess of brownfields remediation and reuse]"). 
Id. 
78. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10. 
[C]leanup approaches at many brownfield properties often rely on legal 
mechanisms referred to as "institutional controls"-such as zoning, property 
easements and covenants, and well drilling bans-to restrict property uses at 
a site with residual contamination. In our environmental insurance study, 
for example, 38% of the developers noted the use of one or more institu-
tional controls, most commonly government controls such as zoning and per-
mitting requirements. 
79. This is an accepted means of dealing with brownfield sites in New Jersey: 
There are several ways to comply with DEP's cleanup standards and criteria. 
And, while permanent remedies are preferred, it is understood and recog-
nized in New Jersey statutes that it does not always make sense to remove all 
contamination at a site. When a "cleanup" limits workers' and residents' 
exposure to contamination and is protective of human health and the envi-
ronment, DEP can and has approved such remedial actions. 
NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Reuse Opportunities and Cleanup Tools, http:// 
www.nj.gov/dep/srp/brownfields/site_reuse.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
80. See Wernstedt et al., Brownfields Phenomenon, supra note 6, at 10 ("These 
institutional controls do not so much as enhance environmental quality through the 
elimination or treatment of contamination as they provide protection by limiting ex-
posure to it."). The title of a workshop at the Brownfields 2005 conference sums it up 
nicely: "Institutional Controls: The Achilles Heel of the Brownfields Program (& 
What Can be Done to Fix this Flaw)." Brownfields 2006, http://www.brownfields2006. 
org/en/SessionsPast.Browser.aspx (select "Brownfields 2005," then search "Search 
Text" for "The Achilles Heal of the Brownfields Program") (last visited Mar. 31, 
2007). See also Schofield, supra note 4, at 956-57 (noting that in passing the 2002 
CERCLA amendments "Congress appears to have improperly assumed that institu-
tional controls as currently implemented can protect human health and the 
environment"). 
81. Enforcement of these restrictions down the line against subsequent landown-
ers, largely a creature of real property law, can also prove difficult. See generally 
Andrea Ruiz-Esquide, The Uniform Environmental Covenants Act-An Environmental 
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a developer-centered approach that is not sufficiently protective of 
the environment.82 
Experience with state voluntary cleanup programs may tell us 
that they need to be revised, and yet the early record has not fre-
quently led to fine tuning of programs. New Jersey made some 
adjustments, so it is worth seeing whether the state critically ex-
amined the brownfields story and took additional steps to protect 
the environment. 
III. NEW JERSEY'S VOLUNTARY CLEANUP PROGRAM: 
TESTING THE BROWNFIELDS STORY 
New Jersey's VCP began in 1992, making it one of the oldest in 
the country.83 The program is governed by oversight rules availa-
ble on the DEP's website,84 and it allows developers flexibility to 
conduct remediation at their own schedule, which is a critical ele-
ment in any brownfields or voluntary cleanup program.85 Addi-
tionally, the developer may terminate the MOA on its own if it so 
desires, and parties may select a partial investigation or cleanup 
without fear of penalties.86 Like other VCPs, not all contaminated 
sites qualify.87 Sites subject to the state superfund-like law, known 
as the "Spill Act,"88 or the federal CERCLA program are not eligi-
ble to take part in the VCP.89 Also, under the oversight rules, the 
Justice Perspective, 31 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1007 (2004) (discussing the problem of enforce-
ment and the Uniform Environmental Covenants Act). 
Id. 
82. See Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A 74. 
I have learned that some local governments do not differentiate between 
brownfield and uncontaminated sites. For example, the fact that a project 
has a major plume beneath it and that the plume is draining into a river that 
feeds into a potable water supply will not discourage some developers from 
expecting environmental scientists to agree with redevelopment schemes 
that pose measurable public health and ecologic risks. Deed restrictions that 
require occupants not to dig underground or not to use basements for a bed-
room may not be followed or enforced. 
83. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
84. N.J. ADMIN. CooE §§ 7:26C-l.1 to -11.4 (2006). 
85. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13; see also supra 
note 43 and accompanying text. 
86. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
87. Id. 
88. Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10 (West 2006). 
89. See N.J. AoMIN. CooE § 7:26C-2.2. 
If the Department, in the exercise of its enforcement discretion, chooses to 
allow a person who is not subject to the Industrial Site Recovery Act or the 
New Jersey Underground Storage of Hazardous Substances Act to conduct 
remediation at a known or suspected contaminated site or area/areas of con-
cern at a site, which the Department has not scheduled for publicly funded 
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DEP may terminate an MOA if it establishes that a property is 
"heavily contaminated and possesses an immediate environmental 
concern."90 In that case, the DEP conducts a cleanup using funds 
from the Spill Compensation Fund, New Jersey's equivalent of the 
Superfund, and recovers the cost of the cleanup from the responsi-
ble party.91 
The VCP is not limited to brownfields sites.92 Indeed, the state 
says "the VCP has also dovetailed nicely within the department's 
brownfields initiatives for providing a tool for easier and faster re-
use of formerly contaminated facilities. "93 Subchapter Three of the 
DEP's Oversight Rules provides the framework for conducting 
voluntary cleanups, known as the "Administrative Process for Vol-
untary Cleanups. "94 This subchapter identifies the general require-
ments for an MOA, the process to request the DEP's oversight of 
the brownfields cleanup, and the procedures for termination of an 
MOA.95 It provides a one-step application for the entry into an 
MOA with the DEP and sets forth specific content requirements, 
including "the applicant shall conduct all remediation pursuant to 
the Technical Requirements for Site Remediation."96 Thus, the 
cleanup standards are the same as for other contaminated sites. 
Under these rules, MOAs can be processed in one step.97 Once the 
department determines that an application is administratively com-
plete, the MOA is in place.98 
The recent Grace Period Rule ("Rule"), promulgated on Sep-
tember 20, 2006, modifies the voluntary cleanup program oversight 
Id. 
remediation, then such participation shall be governed by a memorandum of 
agreement in accordance with N.J.A.C. 7:26C-3. 
The VCP web page indicates that: 
It should be noted that not all contaminated properties qualify for the pro-
gram. Some properties subject to the Industrial Site Recovery Act and the 
Underground Storage Tank or Federal Superfund programs are not part of 
the VCP. Also, if an investigation reveals that a property is heavily contami-
nated and posses [sic] an immediate environmental concern (an acute, direct 
threat to human health or the environment), the department will conduct an 
immediate cleanup using funds from the Spill Compensation Fund. 
NJ. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
90. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
91. See id. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. N.J. ADMIN. CoDE §§ 7:26C-3.l to -3.4. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. § 7:26C-3.3(a)3.iii. 
97. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
98. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.3(a). 
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rules.99 The Rule was promulgated in response to a 1993 New 
Jersey statute, popularly known as the "Grace Period Law" 
("GPL"), intended to allow those charged with "minor" violations 
of state environmental laws to fix them within a designated period 
of time (hence the name) without penalty.100 The Rule revised the 
DEP's imposition of penalties for violations of a number of New 
Jersey's enforcement laws.101 Specific grace periods, ranging from 
thirty to sixty days or more, are made available for specified viola-
tions deemed minor.102 Part of the Rule amends Subchapter 
Three. Under current law, the DEP may terminate an MOA in 
three different sets of circumstances: if the person responsible for 
conducting remediation has (1) "not made scheduled submissions 
to the department pursuant to the schedule set forth in the MOA 
application; (2) has failed to pay the department's oversight cost; 
or (3) has failed to submit documents required by an [MOA] in 
accordance with the technical requirements." 103 The Rule adds 
that the termination of an MOA allows the DEP to "pursue an 
enforcement action against the responsible party for violations of 
any statute or implementing rule, conduct the remediation using 
public funds, and recover those costs from the responsible party or 
any other actions permitted under law."104 Thus, the remediation 
of a site where an applicant had its MOA terminated is governed 
99. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. 
ADMIN. CoDE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815 
grace.pdf. 
100. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1D (West 2003). 
101. As the preamble explains: 
The Department of Environmental Protection hereby adopts amendments 
to the Department Oversight of the Remediation of Contaminated Sites 
Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26C (Oversight Rules) to set forth penalties for violations 
of the Underground Storage Tank Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:14B (UST Rules), the 
Industrial Site Recovery Act Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26B (ISRA Rules), the 
Oversight Rules, N.J.A.C. 7:26C, and the Technical Requirements for Site 
Remediation Rules (Technical Rules.), N.J.A.C. 7:26E, and identify these 
violations as either minor or non-minor for the purpose of providing grace 
periods in accordance with P.L. 1995, c. 296 (N.J.S.A. 13:1D-125 et seq.), 
commonly known as the Grace Period Law. The amendments to these rules 
set forth how the Department will respond to any violation identified as 
minor. 
38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 7), avail-
able at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815grace.pdf. 
102. See id. 
103. N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 7:26C-3.3(c). 
104. Id. § 7:26C-3.3(c)5 (2006). 
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by an Administrative Consent Order, the familiar document man-
dating cleanup under the Spill Act.105 
In purported compliance with the requirement of the GPL, the 
D EP also extended the period of time allowed to correct the three 
deficiencies that would ordinarily allow the DEP to terminate an 
MOA.106 The new rule reads as follows: "The department may 
provide the person responsible for conducting the remediation a 
period of time to correct the deficiency identified in (c)(l).i 
through iii, above, in order to achieve compliance with the memo-
randum of agreement and avoid termination of the memorandum 
of agreement pursuant to (c)(3) below."107 
While the DEP deems this comparable to the specific grace peri-
ods extended to responsible parties conducting cleanups under en-
forcement-driven laws, it clearly is not. For enforcement-driven 
laws, the new Rule provides tables and charts establishing the 
range of "minor" violations with specific grace periods and time 
limits. By contrast, the language "a period of time" is not defined 
in the new language in Subchapter three. It appears that a brown-
field developer operating under an MOA could argue for an indefi-
nite extension of time to complete a cleanup. The DEP's 
comments on the Rule imply that the DEP will do everything it can 
to accommodate developers.108 Any action undertaken pursuant 
105. See Spill Compensation and Control Act, N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 58:10 (West 2006); 
see also N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Protection, Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
106. N.J. AoMIN. CooE § 7:26C-3.3(c)3. 
107. Id. 
108. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. 
AoMrN CooE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815 
grace.pdf. 
[T]his adoption amends the provision at N.J.A.C. 7:26C-3.3(c)2 to allow a 
volunteer remediating a site pursuant to an MOA a period of time to correct 
a deficiency in complying with the MOA prior to termination. This will fur-
ther encourage voluntary remediation including the remediation of 
brownfields by giving the volunteer every possible opportunity to succeed in 
the remediation process. If the volunteer is deficient in complying with the 
terms of the MOA (e.g., fails to submit a document in accordance with the 
schedule that the volunteer submitted to the Department), the Department 
will notify the volunteer of the deficiency, and allow the volunteer time to 
correct the deficiency. During that time period, the Department encourages 
dialogue between the volunteer and the Department's case manager to re-
solve any differences, thus fostering a more collegial relationship. This posi-
tive relationship and experience can only lead to more developers seeking to 
develop brownfield sites, thus promoting smart growth and the economic 
well being of the State. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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to an MOA properly could be viewed as "minor" under the terms 
of the Rule and subject to an extension of time. 
This prospect for delay could be deleterious to the success of the 
program in the case of a developer who is not innocent, as the 
brownfields story assumes. The DEP's staff prepared a "Vulnera-
bility Assessment" in 2002,109 essentially a description of areas 
where the environmental programs administered by the state were 
not meeting legal requirements either because they were under-
staffed, underfunded, or simply overwhelmed. The DEP staff gen-
erated information about the VCP,110 which stated in part that 
seven percent of the sites with MOAs governing cleanups are 
"non-performers" because they are not meeting their legal obliga-
tions under their MOAs.111 This figure is perhaps even more sur-
prising when one considers that a number of sites with MOAs 
governing cleanups are residential real estate transactions where 
potential buyers are concerned with the condition of petroleum 
storage tanks. These tank cleanups are conducted with a "speedy 
turnaround," the goal being to allow sellers "to present a 'No Fur-
ther Action Letter' to buyers in time for settlement."112 Given the 
likelihood that most residential tank cleanups are done in short or-
der, the seven percent non-performer figure is probably higher for 
developers remediating more typical brownfields sites. 
There is reason for concern about the pace of cleanups under-
taken under developers' control. The DEP's internal Vulnerability 
Assessment stated in part, "[t]here are 4921 active MOAs with an 
109. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program, Site 
Remediation Program Vulnerability Assessment (2002), available at http:// 
www.peer.org/docs/nj/06_17 _8_dep_ vulnerable_srp.pdf [hereinafter N.J. Dep't of 
Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program]; see also News Release, Pub. 
Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, Call for Inspector General to Head Mercury 
Day-Care Probe, Severe Toxic Problems Acknowledged in 2002 Internal "Vulnerabil-
ity Assessment" (Aug. 17, 2006), http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=728 
[hereinafter Inspector General] (referring to "a confidential internal DEP 'Vulnera-
bility Assessment' review of the troubled site cleanup program conducted by former 
DEP Commissioner Bradley Campbell in February 2002"). 
110. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program, 
supra note 109. The final "Vulnerability Assessment" did not include the information 
about the VCP; the confidential internal assessment was later made available to the 
New Jersey chapter of PEER. See News Release, Inspector General, supra note 109; 
E-mail from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law, 
University of Richmond School of Law (Sept. 22, 2006, 10:00:31 EST) (on file with 
author). 
111. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program, 
supra note 109. 
112. N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary Cleanup, supra note 13. 
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average age of 3.5 years."113 The length of three and one half years 
is in and of itself fairly striking, being longer than the quick turn-
around in the brownfields story. It is a sizeable fraction, roughly 
one-third to one-half, of the time period of the average CERCLA 
cleanup.114 Given that a number of sites handled by MOAs involve 
residential tank cleanups, it appears that other sites involve 
remediation periods beyond the three and one half year average.115 
This is inconsistent with the brownfields story's notion that the de-
veloper comes in, remediates quickly, and moves on. Without 
more empirical analysis, it is hard to discern the root cause of this 
problem. It may be that developers are addressing more seriously 
contaminated sites in the VCP when the sites should be handled 
elsewhere. It may also be that the state has every intention of han-
dling a site quickly, but a developer delays the process.116 
The standards governing cleanups are the same in either case, 117 
so the primary difference between enforcement sites and those in 
the VCP inheres in allowing developers proceeding under MOAs 
to control the cleanups. If the developer controls the cleanup, 
there are fewer guarantees that it will be handled properly, and it is 
difficult for a state to discern whether the developer has followed 
the MOA's terms.118 The three and one half year figure suggests 
that some developers may in fact fail to follow their MOA obliga-
113. See N.J. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Mgmt. Program, 
supra note 109. 
114. See Jonathan Cannon, Adaptive Management in Superfund: Thinking Like a 
Contaminated Site, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 561, 592 (2005) (noting that "EPA has 
estimated the average time from proposal for listing on the NPL to completion of the 
remedial action at approximately eight years, but a recent study by Resources for the 
Future calculates the average instead at over eleven years"). 
115. E-mail from Bill Wolfe, supra note 10 (stating that "[a]nd that 3.5 years is an 
AVERAGE-it includes lots of residential tank pulls, which can be done in weeks or 
months, not years."). 
116. Without a harder look at state records, this would be extremely difficult to 
assess. Yet that discerning analysis is most urgently needed. This trend is unfortu-
nately all too common in brownfields law and policy. There is a dismaying tendency 
across the nation to evaluate state brownfields programs by relying on formal statutes 
and regulations, not by digging down to "[l]ess formal agency documents, such as 
written policies and memos, as well as any actual anecdotes or aggregate data regard-
ing brownfields projects." See Dana, supra note 7, at 101. 
117. See In re Adoption of N.J.A.C. 7:26E-l.13, 871 A.2d 711 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 
Div. 2005). 
118. See, e.g., Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note, CERCLA Liability Redefined: An Anal-
ysis of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its 
Impact on State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1120 (2004) 
(noting that "[e]ven if the cleanup is sufficient, varying degrees of site cleanliness 
throughout a city or state may become a monitoring burden for the EPA or state 
environmental agencies"). 
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tions. In its response to comments on the draft Rule, the DEP ac-
knowledged that "the department has found that all too often the 
volunteer chooses not to follow the terms of the MOA even though 
it is the volunteer that proposed them in the application."119 New 
Jersey also appears to be moving toward having more licensed con-
sultants supervise brownfield cleanups without additional state 
oversight.120 As in other states where this is a model for remedia-
tion, this too adds to the prospect of a developer running amok. 
A recent and notorious New Jersey case highlighted the poten-
tial disaster involved with allowing developers to control their own 
cleanups. It involved perhaps one of the worst possible nightmares 
for state regulators: residual toxic contamination at a day care 
center, which was brought to the entire state's attention by sick 
children and front page articles in major newspapers.121 The "Kid-
die Kollege" day care site was previously the location of a factory 
used for manufacturing thermometers and related instruments.122 
Throughout the 1980s, the DEP monitored pollution at the site and 
oversaw hazards caused by mercury discharges. In 1994, the manu-
facturer ended its operations. Under New Jersey's environmental 
transfer act (the Industrial Site Recovery Act, or "ISRA"123), this 
should have triggered a cleanup of the mercury at the site. Instead 
the manufacturer, Accutherm, went bankrupt and failed to comply 
with ISRA's requirements.124 
119. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. 
ADMIN CoDE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815 
grace.pdf. 
120. New Jersey instituted a "Cleanup Star" program, under which the DEP "will 
pre-qualify environmental consultants meeting rigorous education, experience and 
professional requirements as 'Cleanup Stars.'" N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Voluntary 
Cleanup, supra note 13. As the VCP web page indicates, "[t]hese 'Cleanup Stars' will 
be permitted to investigate and remediate certain low-priority sites and areas of con-
cern with limited NJDEP oversight. NJDEP will strictly audit Cleanup Stars' work to 
ensure regulatory compliance and protection of public health and the environment." 
Id. 
121. See Sam Wood et al., Second Township Day-Care Operated on Toxic Ground, 
PHILA. INQUIRER, Aug. 20, 2006, at AOl, available at http://www.philly.com/mld/in-
quirer/15317594.htm; see also Tina Kelley, New Jersey Vows to Overhaul Environmen-
tal Cleanup Work, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2006, at B2, available at http:// 
travel2.nytimes.com/2006/10/24/nyregion/24dep.html (describing the aftermath of the 
Kiddie Kollege fiasco); News Release, Pub. Employees for Envtl. Responsibility, 
MERCURY-LADEN DAY-CARE CENTER IN NEW JERSEY Is No ANOMALY-Lax State 
Brownfield Laws Make Tragedy an "Accident Waiting to Happen" (Aug. 7, 2006), 
http://www.peer.org/news/news_id.php?row_id=722 [hereinafter Mercury-Laden Day-
care]. 
122. See News Release, Mercury-Laden Day Care, supra note 121. 
123. Industrial Site Recovery Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 13:1K (West 2003). 
124. See Sam Wood et al., supra note 121, at AOL 
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Various investigations were done at the site between 1994 and 
1995.125 In 1996, the DEP requested that the EPA regional office 
perform an assessment of the property,126 which found "several 
small droplets of mercury were located on the floor of an area be-
lieved to be one of the production rooms."127 In 1996, however, 
the site was deemed ineligible for a removal action conducted 
under CERCLA.128 The property was transferred to Navillus 
Group in 1997.129 In 2002, Jim Sullivan, Inc. purchased the site 
from Na villus and two years later converted the property to a day 
care center.130 
In April, 2006, the DEP contacted the new property owner, Jim 
Sullivan of Jim Sullivan, Inc., to determine what measures, if any, 
had been undertaken to address site contamination.131 A discus-
sion ensued and on June 21, 2006, DEP informed Sullivan that he 
should enter the VCP and submit an MOA application.132 One 
month later, the sampling found mercury in the building and 
"based on these findings and consultation with NJDEP and 
NJDH&SS [New Jersey Department of Health and Senior Ser-
vices] technical staff, it was determined that the building was not fit 
for occupancy at this time."133 Thus, a site which should have been 
cleaned up as a mercury hazard wound up (at least for a period of 
time) being considered for the VCP. 
The facts of the Kiddie Kollege scenario may be a bit unusual. 
The story does highlight, however, the possibility in states with vol-
untary cleanup programs whose eligibility is open to all sites, not 
just brownfields sites, to have contamination exceed the "light con-
125. Mercury Timeline, Information, http://www.nbclO.com/news/9655585/de-
tail.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) (detailing a bank's environmental investigation in 
1994 and a NJDEP investigation of the exterior of the site in 1995). 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. According to the timeline released by the DEP, the EPA concluded on 
January 16, 1996 "that based on air monitoring, soil sample analysis, wipe sample 
analysis and the condition and security of the building and surrounding property, the 
site does not present an immediate threat to human health or the environment."' Id. 
A "NJDEP Memorandum to the File" in June indicated that the EPA had "deter-
mined that the site was not eligible for a removal action; however, due to documented 
contamination present, the site require further investigation and remediation." Id. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. 
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tamination" levels expected under the brownfields story.134 That a 
site such as Kiddie Kollege may fall through the cracks should 
serve as a warning to New Jersey and other states to revise the 
assumptions they make about brownfield sites and look for more 
of a demonstration from innocent developers up front. States 
should check the history of sites more thoroughly to see whether 
the site or any developer associated with the site is or should be 
involved in a pending enforcement action. 
New Jersey and other states should also address what happens if 
remediation turns out to be inadequate. Some brownfields devel-
opers do not fit the story of the innocent developer who wishes to 
proceed quickly through a state voluntary cleanup program, re-
ceive liability protection, and move on with development.135 In this 
sense, New Jersey's Grace Period Rule is the wrong approach be-
cause it gives recalcitrant developers more time for delay. The 
Rule gives developers an indefinite period of time to correct any 
deficiencies the DEP may have discovered while overseeing the 
remediation process; this is susceptible to manipulation by unscru-
pulous developers. 
The DEP has the option under the Rule to terminate an 
MOA.136 The developer whose MOA is terminated may reapply 
and pay a $1,000 reapplication fee.137 In the context of a large site 
with considerable complexity, and perhaps extensive contamina-
tion, $1,000 is clearly de minimis. In contrast, the commenters on 
drafts of the Rule, nearly all of whom represented developers or 
were themselves developers, perceived that any change to the VCP 
to impose additional requirements on developers was clearly un-
warranted.138 This is another unfortunate outcome of a developer-
centered approach. It allows developers to believe that any hin-
drance to cleanup and reuse of a brownfield site, no matter how 
134. See Kelley, supra note 121, at B2 (quoting public officials and representatives 
of public interest environmental groups who favor an overhaul of New Jersey's 
cleanup programs in the aftermath of the Kiddie Kollege fiasco). 
135. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (Sept. 18, 2006) (codified in scattered sections of N.J. 
AoMIN CooE tit. 7), available at http://www.nj.gov/dep/rules/adoptions/2006_0815 
grace.pdf ("Frivolous MOAs contribute to Departmental caseload management diffi-
culties and require Department staff to direct their time towards cases in which there 
was never an intention by the person responsible for conducting the remediation to 
do any remedial work at the site."). 
136. See id. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
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small, is a "take back" that hampers the program.139 No one would 
doubt the ability of developers and their representatives to plead 
their case. Yet, catering to them makes a $1,000 reapplication fee a 
program "drawback," even though the fee may have been imposed 
after a developer consistently flouted the Oversight Rules. 
The DEP's ability to terminate an MOA and move a site into the 
enforcement category appears, at first blush, a strong and credible 
threat. Yet the DEP itself stated that it does not intend to increase 
the number of MOAs it terminates.140 As Professor David Dana 
has expressed cogently, there are numerous reasons why a state 
environmental agency might not want to bring enforcement action 
at a brownfield site, most notably that it would have to admit that 
its oversight failed. 141 In New Jersey's case, the state made its in-
tent quite clear. In its responses to comments on the Rule it stated, 
"[t]he Grace Period amendments do not apply to the Voluntary 
Cleanup Program; hence there will be no enforcement of 
MOAs."142 Some expressed concern that even if the state were 
willing to act more forcefully, it lacks the resources to follow 
139. State regulators may even believe that gathering more comprehensive data on 
cleanups and their efficacy might hamper a program's progress. See Dana, supra note 
7, at 103 (noting that "[d]evelopers might not want outcomes at their sites measured 
for fear that the data would be used by regulators as a basis for re-opening the 
brownfields cleanups pursuant to re-opener clauses in the agreements between devel-
opers and the state government"). 
140. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a) (stating that "[t]he Department does not intend to 
increase the number of MOAs that it terminates"). 
141. See Dana, supra note 7, at 95. 
Id. 
[P]eople and institutions prefer not to admit that they were wrong, particu-
larly about a public health matter, either to themselves (which is psychologi-
cally upsetting) or to others (which is damaging to one's reputation). Once a 
state agency has expressly approved, even subsidized in many cases, a 
brownfields cleanup, its staff may not relish acknowledging that the site 
poses some health or environmental risk and that more remediation is there-
fore necessary. After all, doing so would be perceived (rightly or wrongly) 
as an acknowledgement that the original cleanup plan approved by regula-
tors was inadequate or inadequately supervised by those regulators. 
142. See 38 N.J. Reg. 3821(a); see also E-mail from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J. 
PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law 
(Sept. 20, 2006, 21:10:39 EST) (on file with author). 
The other big policy issue is the accommodation of the industry view on 
applicability-if a MOA was executed on a voluntary basis, the DEP has 
agreed to honor that voluntary expectation. So in addition to not terminat-
ing any more MOA's, the DEP will not issue enforcement action for failing 
to accomplish the tasks and commitments set forth in the MOA regardless of 
how bad the MOA is performaing[sic] or what the impact is on health or 
environment. 
E-mail from Bill Wolfe, supra. 
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through on enforcement (for example, to enter into more Adminis-
trative Consent Orders ). 143 
Assuming for the moment that the state could (or would) pro-
ceed with enforcement activities against a brownfields developer, 
the recent controversies surrounding the cleanup program cast 
doubt on the program's ability to get sites cleaned up correctly and 
promptly. The New Jersey General Assembly has held hearings 
over the past year about cleanups at major sites that appear to 
have been botched.144 With respect to one aspect of toxic waste 
cleanup-proceeding to address the worst sites first-internal doc-
uments from the DEP made available to the organization Public 
Employees for Environmental Responsibility ("PEER") show that 
the Spill Act program lags behind its statutory deadlines to provide 
and use a risk-based list ranking of the most dangerous sites.145 
143. Telephone Call from Bill Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER, to Joel B. Eisen, Profes-
sor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law (Sept. 18, 2006) (transcript on file 
with author). 
144. See, e.g., Testimony from Invited Individuals, Including Representatives of the 
New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection, Concerning the Use and Dis-
posal of Contaminated Concrete Materials at Redevelopment Sites in Mercer, Mid-
dlesex and Ocean Counties from the Ford Motor Company Site in Edison Township, 
Middlesex County Before the Joint Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm. 
and Assemb. Environment & Solid Waste Comm. (N.J. June 1, 2006), available at 
http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/ajuaen060106.pdf; Transcript of 
the Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm. (N.J. June 15, 2006), available 
at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/legislativepub/pubhear/aju061506.pdf; see also Testi-
mony from Invited Individuals, Including Representatives of the New Jersey Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection, Concerning the Use and Disposal of 
Contaminated Concrete Materials at Redevelopment Sites in Mercer, Middlesex and 
Ocean Counties from the Ford Motor Company Site in Edison Township, Middlesex 
County Before the Joint Comm. Meeting of the Assemb. Judiciary Comm. and As-
semb. Environment & Solid Waste Comm. (N.J. June 1, 2006) (testimony of Bill 
Wolfe, Director, N.J. PEER), available at http://www.peer.org/docs/nj/06_1_6_peer_ 
testimony.pdf. 
For an in-depth report on the mishandling of one site, see Jan Barry et al., Toxic 
Legacy, RECORD, Oct. 2-6, 2005, http://www.northjersey.com/toxiclegacy/series.html 
(five-part series about former Ford plant in Mahwah). Bruce Springsteen may have 
told a tragic tale of the fate of an auto worker who lost his job that begins, "[t]hey 
closed down the auto plant in Mahwah late that month," BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, 
Johnny 99, on NEBRASKA (Columbia Records 1982), but what happened later at that 
site is perhaps even more tragic. 
145. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Management Prog., Hot 
Issue (Dec. 2004) (on file with author) (stating "[t]he Department never published a 
complete list of ranked sites and did not use the list to select sites for public funding"); 
see also N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Site Remediation & Waste Management Prog., 
Remedial Priority System Options Paper (Sept. 2004) (on file with author) ("The De-
partment has not ranked sites since approximately 2000. The group that ranked sites 
was disbanded so there is no group of people assigned to do this work."). 
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In any event, the state should exercise more oversight over 
brownfields sites, not less. It should not allow theoretically unlim-
ited periods of time for brownfields developers to decide whether 
to comply with MOAs. The state could have complied with the 
GPL by considering some paperwork submissions to be minor, but 
deemed technical deficiencies such as a failure to meet the techni-
cal specifications of the Oversight Rules to be major and corrected 
immediately. The DEP appears to use its discretion to decide 
whether a developer made a serious error. This runs the risk of 
inadequate and unsupervised cleanups, particularly if the hammer 
available to the state-revoking the MOA and moving to enforce-
ment action-is not a credible threat. 
IV. BROWNFIELDS POLICIES AND "SMART GROWTH" 
The very thing that made the brownfields policy so compelling 
when it was first developed in the early 1990s is also the thing 
that makes it so vulnerable to criticism. . .. That is, it tries to do 
several major things, like . . . bring back these sites and some 
kind of community benefit in the form of development. Every 
site is unique and rife with opportunities and incentives for po-
litical manipulation, comer-cutting and land-use mistakes . . 
146 
Even if a brownfield site is remediated effectively, we should still 
ask whether the specific economic development at that site is ap-
propriate. Every community will have a different perspective on 
this, so defining appropriate metrics for measuring success presents 
a difficult problem. In this Part, I test one claim that proponents of 
brownfields revitalization routinely make: that it is an essential 
component of "smart growth" strategies.147 "Smart growth" man-
agement of land use has the potential to be a "revolution" in land 
use law.148 As New Jersey defines it, "[s]mart growth is the term 
used to describe well-planned, well-managed growth that adds new 
homes and creates new jobs, while preserving open space, farm-
146. Alexander Lane, From Hazard to Hope?: Redeveloping Old Industrial Sites 
Can Be a Boon or a Bust, STAR-LEDGER, May 23, 2004, at 1 (quoting Prof. William 
Shutkin of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology). 
147. On "smart growth," see generally Colloquium, A Look at Smart Growth and 
Urban Sprawl, 21 ST. LOUIS U. Pus. L. REV. 253 (2002); Patricia E. Salkin, Smart 
Growth and Sustainable Development: Threads of a National Land Use Policy, 36 
VAL. U. L. REv. 381 (2002); Special Series: New Urbanism and Smart Growth, 29 
FORDHAM URS. L.J. 1419 (2002). 
148. Richard Briffault, Smart Growth and American Land Use Law, 21 ST. LOUIS 
U. Pus. L. REv. 253, 253 (2002). 
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land, and environmental resources."149 Space does not permit a 
full description of the wide variety of locality-specific options150 
that a smart growth strategy would employ to check the increasing 
sprawl at suburban and exurban sites.151 
While brownfields policies and smart growth gained enormous 
traction at roughly the same time in the 1990s, the link between the 
two is hardly coincidental.152 There are essentially two aspects of 
this. First, urban locations are ideal for the higher-density, pedes-
trian-friendly, resource-conserving infill developments sought by 
smart growth advocates. 153 Some major success stories attributed 
to brownfields policies are mega-developments bringing stores, 
apartments, and parks together in one urban place. This has led at 
least one observer to note that VCPs and a generally more 
favorable attitude toward infill developments have gone hand in 
hand.154 The second part of the "brownfields redevelopment is 
149. N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Office of Smart Growth, http://www.nj.gov/dca/ 
osg/smart/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
150. New Jersey's smart growth "principles" are broad-ranging and include "mixed-
use development, walkable town centers and neighborhoods, mass transit accessibil-
ity, sustainable economic and social development and preserved green space." Id. 
These could be carried out in a specific context by a whole host of different 
techniques. 
151. For fuller discussions of "smart growth," see generally Briffault, supra note 
148; Oliver A. Pollard, III, Smart Growth: The Promise, Politics, and Potential Pitfalls 
of Emerging Growth Management Strategies, 19 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 247 (2000). For a 
counter perspective, see Dwight H. Merriam & Gurdon H. Buck, Smart Growth, 
Dumb Takings, 29 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,746 (1999). 
152. A good example of a governmental program linking brownfields redevelop-
ment and smart growth in specific communities is the EPA's "Smart Growth in 
Brownfield Communities" initiative, which claims that, "(b]rownfield redevelopment 
is an essential component of smart growth, as both seek to return abandoned and 
underutilized sites to their fullest potential as community and economic assets." U.S. 
Envtl. Prot. Agency., Smart Growth in Brownfield Communities, http://www.epa.gov/ 
piedpage/brownfields.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
153. Edward T. Canuel, Supporting Smart Growth Legislation and Audits: An Anal-
ysis of U.S. and Canadian Land Planning Theories and Tools, 13 M1ctt. ST. J. INT'L L. 
309, 314 (2005). 
Principles of Smart Growth are epitomized by "(c]ompact, transit accessible, 
pedestrian-oriented, mixed-use development patterns and land reuse" in a 
system which "refocuses a larger share of regional growth within central cit-
ies, urbanized areas, inner suburbs and areas that are already served by in-
frastructure." Such goals are achieved through measures including "[t]ax 
incentives, brownfield redevelopment, elimination of sprawl-enhancing sub-
sidies, (the development of] urban growth boundaries, and transferable de-
velopment rights." 
Id. (citations omitted). 
154. Opp & Hollis, supra note 2, at 8 ("The popularity of VCPs and the increase in 
their use over the past 10 years could be attributed in part to a changing attitude 
towards infill projects, and the growing realization by city planners, development pro-
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smart growth" linkage is that an infill development might preclude 
the need for new development at a suburban location. The 
brownfields story assumes that mega-developments would proceed 
at greenfields sites if not for incentives to clean up and reuse the 
urban sites. As a result, there is an almost one-for-one tradeoff 
between a brownfield site saved and a greenfield site protected. 
This does not necessarily make growth "smart"; it simply makes it 
inevitable. 
Reuse of urban space in New Jersey and many other states is 
seen almost reflexively as smart growth. Indeed, several New 
Jersey programs are conducted within the state's Office of Smart 
Growth ("OSG").155 Yet when we look at the brownfields pro-
grams and the experiences with them, it is not clear that all 
brownfields revitalization achieves smart growth. The number of 
brownfields sites with useful development potential is a relatively 
small subset of the overall number.156 In addition, because a devel-
oper of a brownfields parcel with development potential dictates 
the terms of the redevelopment strategy on a parcel-by-parcel basis 
(in most jurisdictions, brownfields revitalization occurs one site at a 
time), there is no guarantee that the growth it promises to provide 
is "smart." 
The controversy surrounding the recent plan for the "Atlantic 
Yards" area of Brooklyn is perhaps typical. 157 The plan envisions a 
"large-scale, mixed-use real estate development"158 on a 
brownfields site with "a long history of rail, industrial, storage, 
fessionals and citizens that reuse projects are both economically practical and impor-
tant for a high quality of both urban and rural life."). 
155. As the OSG website states, "[t]he New Jersey Brownfields Redevelopment 
Task Force assists municipalities and counties in using brownfield redevelopment to 
help implement Smart Growth strategies in their plans and initiating an inventory of 
marketable brownfield sites for prospective developers with the support of the 
Brownfields Redevelopment Interagency Team." N.J. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, Office 
of Smart Growth, Brownfields, http://www.nj.gov/dca/osg/commissions/brownfields/ 
index.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 2007). 
156. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74. 
Id. 
For every brownfields site that is on 10 or more acres, is well located with 
respect to transportation and other infrastructure, and will host a redevelop-
ment of = $100 million, there will be 20 or more that will be on less than 3-
acre sites located in an unfavorable location that has little obvious appeal to 
private investors. 
157. See PlanNYC: New York City Planning Information Portal, http://www.plan 
nyc.org/projects (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter PlanNYC] (describing the 
project and providing links to organizations both supporting and opposing the 
project). 
158. Id. 
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manufacturing, and commercial uses,"159 "that would consist of a 
19,000-seat basketball arena; 4,500 units of housing; over 2.4 mil-
lion square feet of office and retail space; and six acres of open 
space and parking for 3,000 cars. "160 This development has been 
fiercely opposed by a number of community groups.161 
The mega-development chosen for the urban brownfield site 
may pay some attention to smart growth principles, as in the case 
of Atlantic Yards. Others, however, might argue that development 
is not "smart" if it consists of expensive sports stadiums or high-
priced condominiums that defeat neighborhood expectations of af-
fordable housing.162 Local officials' promises may not necessarily 
equate to beneficial outcomes, particularly if community residents 
have little say in planning for the remediation and reuse at the site. 
The brownfields process, like any urban land use development pro-
cess, is subject to capture by well-heeled, politically savvy develop-
ers and a resulting distrust by local residents.163 As one story on 
brownfields projects in New Jersey puts it, "with millions of dollars 
in government incentives at stake, and with the design and ap-
proval of cleanup remedies subjective and malleable from site to 
site, the brownfields process is seen as particularly open to political 
manipulation."164 The story cited "revelations that former Gover-
nor Jim Florio and some partners cut a deal for a bargain price on 
a publicly owned brownfield in Jersey City," and the "recent deci-
sion to pull Keamy's Standard Chlorine site-one of the state's 
most polluted sites-from the federal Superfund list so a developer 
159. EMPIRE STATE DEV. CORP., ATLANTIC YARDS ARENA AND REDEVELOPMENT 
PROJECT at 10-1(July2006), available at http://www.empire.state.ny.us/pdf/AtlanticY-
ards/DEIS/lO_Hazardous_Materials/lO_HazMat.pdf. 
160. PlanNYC, supra note 157. 
161. See id. (providing links to these groups, including "Brooklyn Against Destruc-
tive Development" and "Field of Schemes"). 
162. Lane, supra note 146, at 1 (quoting Joe Morris of Jersey City's Interfaith Com-
munity Organization, who observes that, "[i]f you ask 100 people in Jersey City what 
should be done with vacant land, 99 of them tell you affordable housing . . . [b Jut 
that never gets factored in when a brownfields developer pops in from out of town"); 
see also Jennifer Steinhauer, A Cleanup That's Easier Legislated than Done, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, at 47 (noting the frustration by environmental and neighborhood 
advocates about the slow pace of New York's brownfields program in getting sites for 
affordable housing into the program). 
163. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74 (noting that "[i]n our 
public surveys, it is clear that the public does not necessarily trust its local elected 
officials' and developers' characterizations of environmental risk, nor their assertions 
that the local infrastructure and schools can meet added demands caused by 
redevelopment"). 
164. Lane, supra note 146, at 1. 
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can build warehouses there. "165 This latter development highlights 
another point made earlier, that "the brownfields model works 
well on modestly contaminated sites, but to use it to address a mas-
sively contaminated site is asking the market to do more than it 
can."166 
Controversy of this sort does not in and of itself mean that 
brownfields development should not proceed. Instead, it simply 
tells us that even though the brownfields story assumes develop-
ment is preferable to inertia, the merits of the proposed real estate 
project must be tested in each individual case. There is a means 
available to New Jersey to examine whether its policies are having 
the desired effect. It has data available that would allow for a 
more thorough analysis of whether brownfields developers in New 
Jersey are consistently providing promised economic benefits in re-
turn for involvement with and remediation of their sites. The state 
maintains two extensive databases; a "Known Contaminated Sites" 
list that includes (among other data) the number, type, and name 
of developers receiving No Further Action letters,167 and one 
maintained by the OSG on sites that fit state and local develop-
ment criteria.168 More work needs to be done to see whether sites 
in these two databases are closely correlated. As Professor Dana 
has suggested, in-depth analysis of this sort might yield results that 
would run contrary to the story of brownfields as an engine of eco-
nomic redevelopment, and state regulators may be consequently 
reluctant to perform this searching analysis.169 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (quoting Kearny Mayor Alberto Santos). 
167. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., NJDEP Known Contaminated Site List for New 
Jersey, 2005, http://www.nj.gov/dep/gis/digidownload/metadata/statewide/kcsl.htm 
("The Known Contaminated Sites List for New Jersey 2005 are those sites and 
properties within the state where contamination of soil or ground water has been 
identified or where there has been, or there is suspected to have been, a discharge of 
contamination. This list of Known Contaminated Sites may include sites where 
remediation is either currently under way, required but not yet initiated or has been 
completed."). 
168. The OSG maintains an extensive collection of digital Geographic Information 
System ("GIS") data, including a number of files which show how sites fit within state 
smart growth plans. See N.J. Dep't of Cmy. Affairs, Office Smart Growth, Maps and 
GIS Data, http://www.state.nj.us/dca/osg/resources/maps.shtml (last visited Mar. 31, 
2007). 
169. Dana, supra note 7, at 95. 
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In some states, there is recognition that brownfields remediation 
should take place in conjunction with redevelopment.170 In the 
BDA initiative, which began in 2002, New Jersey has made a signif-
icant attempt to bring together developers and municipalities in a 
systematic way to yield effective remediation and economic bene-
fits.171 In the BDA program, the DEP "works with selected com-
munities affected by multiple brownfields to design and implement 
remediation and reuse plans for these properties simultane-
ously. "172 The mechanism for this involves community-based 
"steering committees"173 that "propose 'clusters' of closely spaced 
brownfield sites to DEP for coordinated oversight of the remedial 
process."174 The BDA application requires a steering committee to 
submit "a description and explanation of the BDA, a discussion of 
the proposed BDA boundaries, current activities and uses within 
the BDA, and a clear identification of the brownfields within the 
BDA that the Steering Committee intends to address." 175 Current 
BDA communities include Camden, Elizabeth, Hillside, Irvington, 
Newark, Palmyra, and Trenton,176 and more are in the works. 
The contrast with the normal brownfields development process 
is striking, as described in a recent article by Evan van Hook, a 
former DEP Assistant Commissioner and a driving force behind 
the BDA initiative.177 Ordinarily, as noted above, states do not 
170. See Bartsch, State of States, supra note 39, at 14 ("More states are channeling 
resources to sites with some end use or economic development activity in mind-with 
the thinking shifting from cleanup only to a cleanup-and-reuse strategy."). 
171. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, supra 
note 20. 
172. Id. 
173. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brief Synopsis of NJDEP's Brownfields Develop-
ment Area Initiative, http://www.state.nj.us/dep/srp/brownfields/bda/ 
bda_synopsis.htm (last visited Mar. 31, 2007) [hereinafter N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 
Brief Synopsis). 
174. See News Release, N.J. DEP'T OF ENVTL. PRoT., DEP lssuEs ENFORCEMENT 
DIRECTIVES AGAINST THREE COMPANIES TO COMPEL CLEANUP: ACTION SUPPORTS 
STATE BROWNFIELD REDEVELOPMENT AREA INITIATIVE (Nov. 18, 2003), HTTP:// 
WWW.NJ.GOV/DEP/NEWSREURELEASES/03_0165.HTM. 
175. N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brief Synopsis, supra note 173. 
176. See N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., Brownfields Development Area Initiative, supra 
note 20. 
177. See van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 118. 
In his 2000 article, van Hook developed a theoretical framework for an area-
wide brownfield redevelopment program. The framework follows four basic 
principles: (1) establish a process to "define and delineate areas affected by 
multiple brownfields;" (2) aggregate financial and technical resources and 
incentives; (3) develop area-wide remediation and redevelopment plans; and 
(4) "provide ongoing, [coordinated, cross-property,] focused support, incen-
tives and assistance for remediation and redevelopment of the brownfields 
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typically require brownfields developers to demonstrate that their 
proposed reuse of the property is consistent with an overall vision 
for the community. In the BDA initiative, this perspective 
changes, as Van Hook observes that "involvement in shaping the 
new uses to which the brownfields will be put . . . is particularly 
enhanced."178 The steering committee's vision of the proposed re-
use is not necessarily the one that will inevitably be adopted: 
"While BDA steering committees do not have the ability to dictate 
reuse on all properties, however, the BDA Initiative does give the 
reuse preferences of the steering committee substantial persuasive 
force." 179 
Van Hook notes that "the BDA Initiative appears to result in 
increased efficiency and effectiveness in the remediation pro-
cess. "180 One obvious advantage of a multi-site, clustered ap-
proach is its ability to address cross-contamination among 
brownfields sites at the same location. Ordinarily, the developer of 
a site addresses contamination within the legal boundaries of its 
own site, 181 but in a BDA, by "addressing closely spaced contami-
nated properties in a concerted effort, the BDA approach helps 
ensure that this cross-contamination will not occur, regardless of 
the chemical or physical process involved. "182 Van Hook even ob-
serves that the "potential for cross-property contamination" should 
become a factor in selecting BDAs, to capitalize on the benefits of 
remediating multiple sites at once in the same area.183 
Finally, there is the potential for significant community involve-
ment. Negotiations regarding redevelopment of brownfields sites 
ordinarily take place between the developer and local officials, 
which can give developers the upper hand.184 Of course, a savvy 
Id. 
area in accordance with the area-wide plans." These principles are reflected 
in the design of the New Jersey BDA Initiative. 
178. Id. at 140. 
179. Id. 
180. Id. at 128. 
181. Albert I. Telsey & Sally A. Jones, Brownfields Development Area Initiative Is 
an Idea in the Making, N.J.L.J., Oct. 20, 2003, at S-10, available at http:// 
www.westonsolutions.com/pdf_docs/SJonesLNJLawJournal.pdf (noting that "[t ]he 
owner of a brownfields property usually did not look over the fence to see how he 
might be able to tie-in his cleanup with remedial action being undertaken by his 
neighbors"). 
182. Van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 131. 
183. Id. 
184. See, e.g., Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A 74 ("For example, to make 
enough money to pay the cleanup costs, a housing developer can be expected to ask 
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developer may choose to reach out to the affected community,185 
but is not normally required to do so.186 By contrast, the BDA 
initiative, with its use of the broad-based local steering committee, 
explicitly guarantees local involvement. As one recent analysis of 
several state area-wide brownfields programs puts it, "[i]n contrast 
to site-specific remediation, the area-wide approach of the [New 
Jersey] BDA provides a framework that addresses the larger physi-
cal, political and social contexts of an affected community."187 
V. CONCLUSION 
Brownfields revitalization is here to stay. It is so popular with a 
broad coalition of advocates that states vie for bragging rights 
about their programs' successes.188 At the same time, the 
brownfields story's limitations are also beginning to show. There 
are more contaminated sites being addressed in state VCPs, and 
perhaps less rapid progress at the average site than the story might 
have suggested would take place.189 In this respect, the New Jersey 
Grace Period Rule represents incremental backsliding, offering the 
potential for longer cleanups and the ability for developers to 
evade program rules and responsibilities. 
Allowing developers to control their own cleanups also does not 
comport with a vision of community-wide real estate development, 
such that after a decade of experience, a "consensus is building 
among environmental and real estate professionals that the 
remediation and reuse of brownfields that were not addressed 
through 'first generation' brownfield programs will require new 
strategies. "190 A second generation of brownfields policies, such as 
New Jersey's BDA initiative, is needed. Second generation 
brownfields policies should allow for more area-wide, community-
focused processes, like the BDA initiative, to capitalize more effec-
tively upon the economic promise of the brownfields story. An ap-
proach such as the BDA has the potential for considerable 
for more units per acre, for permission to put parking on top of areas with residual 
contamination, and for deed restrictions on the use of property."). 
185. See generally BARTSCH ET AL., COMING CLEAN, supra note 35. 
186. See generally Eisen, Brownfields of Dreams, supra note 3. 
187. Kris Wernstedt & Jennifer Hanson, Areawide Brownfield Regeneration 
Through Business-Based Land Trusts and Progressive Finance 7 (Lincoln Inst. of 
Land Pol'y, Working Paper WP06KW1, 2006), available at http://www.lincolninst.edu/ 
pubs/dl/1096_ Wernstedt_complete_ web.pdf. 
188. Greenberg, Editorial, supra note 38, at A74. 
189. See News Release, Inspector General, supra note 109. 
190. Van Hook et al., supra note 19, at 152. 
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advantages over parcel-by-parcel brownfields development, and 
brings brownfields revitalization closer to the ideal of "smart 
growth" than leaving development solely in the hands of individual 
developers.191 
191. Id. at 114. 
